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Overview: current debates in critical social theory 
. 
Meta-Comments on the Very Idea of a Critical Theoiy: Raymond Guess 
and The Idea of a Critical Theory 
By Kai Nielsen 
University of Calgaiy 
The Frankfurt School and Jurgen Habermas have developed critic a 1 theory 
but they have not been very successful in saying in general what cri ti ca 1 theory 
is, in what its criticalness consists and how it differs from other comprehensive 
conceptions of social science and of philosophy. Raymond Geuss in his Tlzc Idea 
of a Critical Theory leaps into the breach and carefully and probingly seeks tu 
answer these related questions.1 
Jurgen Ha bermas, for all his extensive departures from Marx, sees himself 
as a Marxian.2 Marx, on Habermas's account, and on the account of not a few 
others, should himself be viewed as a critical theorist. There are, specific 
problems about Marx's account aside, not unsurprisingly, general problems 
about the very status of his account that are importantly similar to the problems 
that affect later more explicitly articulated critical theory. They are questions 
about theverynatureoftheenterprise. On theveryfirstpageofhis book Geuss 
puts the problem thus: 
It is widely recognized that Marx was a revolutionary figure, 
but the exact nature of the revolution he initiated has not, in 
general, been correctly understood. Of course, Marx did 
dramatically change many people's views about an impor-
tant subject-matter, human society, but in some ways the 
greatest significance of his work lies in its implications for 
epistemology. Marx's theory of society, if properly con-
strued, does clearly give us knowledge of society, but does 
not easily fit into any of the accepted categories of 'knowl-
edge'. It obviously isn't a formal science like logic or math-
ematics, or a practical skill. Its supporters generally deny 
that it is a speculative world-view of the kind traditionally 
provided by religion and philosophy, yet neither would it 
seem to be correctly interpreted as a strictly empirical theory 
like those in natural science. Finally, it isn't just a confused 
melange of cognitive and non-cognitive elements, an em piri-
cal economics fortuitously conjoined with a set of value 
judgments and moral commitments. Rather Marxism is a 
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radically new kind of theory; to give a proper philosophic 
account of its salient features requires drastic revisions in 
traditional views about the nature of knowledge.(1) 
Not all Marxists, Marxians (including most particularly analytical Marx-
ists) or students of Marx would be happy with this characteri~ation . They 
would particularly demur at the claim that "in some ways the greatest 
significance of his work lies in its implications for epistemology."(1) They 
would rather stick with Engels's general summing up of the import of Marx's 
work where the claim is (a) that Marx was first and foremost a revolutionary 
activist and (b) that he made a Copernican turn in the social sciences, giving us 
a science that told us about the fundamental social structure of society, 
explained how and why from one epoch to another societies would change nnd 
(c) how this very social science would be a 'revolutionary social science' 
serving as a crucial tool, though not only that, in the making and sustaining of 
revolutions.3 But this, analytical Marxists would stress, requires no new 
epistemology or epistemological reorientation, but just a good standard but 
rather comprehensive social science. The knowledge that Marx gives us is of 
a straightforwardly empirical kind, but, given our interests (if we are not 
members of the haute bourgeoisie) and our reflective moral beliefs, we will put 
that empirical knowledge to revolutionary or to at least emancipatory uses. 
Analytical Marxists will respond to critical theorists that this requires no 
special conception of knowledge or an altered epistemological stance or (for 
that matter) any epistemological stance atall or a realignment of the categories 
of knowledge. Nothing so conceptually surprising should enter in. We should 
not, analytical Marxists claim, think of Marxism as a new kind of theory or even 
a new kind of method but as a developing comprehensive empirical social 
theory working within theparametersoftheestablishedsocial sciences.4 What 
makes it different-the content of its particular claims aside-is that it is a theory 
which its practitioners can put to work in the service of the interests of the 
working class and finally, through the service of those interests, to humanity 
generally. (That it can do this is not, of course, independent of what the context 
is.) But it neither requires nor suggests a conceptual revolution which would 
shake up our traditional views about the nature of knowledge. Marx, as he 
made clear enough in The German Ideology~ settled his accounts with philosophy 
and moved to a philosophically unencumbered concern with revolutionnry 
activity and the constructing of a comprehensive social science which would 
give us a true account of what the social world is like and would be useful in 
the class struggle for human emancipation. Geuss and the critical theorists 
who developed their distinctive brand of neo-Marxism think otherwise. Whnt-
ever Marx's beliefs about the nature of his own work, the work itself is not so 
straightforwardly empirical. Whether or not, they argue, we should speak of 
'Marx's method' or of a 'distinctive Marxian method' we should recognize that 
critical theory is ~mportantly different in kind from a strictly empirical theory 
such as Max Weber's or Talcott Parson's or Paul Samuelson's. 
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Realizing that quite a few different things are going on in Das Kapital, for 
example, thanina systematicvalue-freesocialscience, both analytical Marxists 
and critical theorists need to face the challenge of Karl Popper that Marx's 
theory and Marxist theories more generally . are "a confused melange of 
cognitive and non-cognitive elements, an empirical economics fortuitously 
conjoined with a setofvaluejudgrnents and moral commitrnents."5 Analytical 
Marxists respond to this charge by rationally reconstructing Marx and Marxian 
theory in such a way that the moral commitments are purged from the 
empirical social theory, and they are separately argued for as part of an 
independent moral account competing with the work of Rawls, Nozick, 
Gauthier, Walzer and Dworkin. G.A. Cohen, Jon Elster, John Roemer, Jeffrey 
Reiman all brilliantly exemplify this work.6 However, it is-whether rightly or 
wrongly-philosophically and conceptually conservative, giving us what in 
Frankfurt School terms and in Geuss's terms is a 'positivist Marx'. 
Critical theory by contrast seeks to construct a theory which as a compre-
hensive social science (where 'science' is construed non-scientistically) inte-
grates into a single theory the descriptive-explanatory-interpretive side of 
things and the normative-evaluative-emancipatory side of things. The positiv-
ist challenge is that this will, if we try to place it in an integrated single theory, 
remain a confused :r:nelange. Geuss seeks to elucidate, and where necessary 
rationally to reconstruct, critical theory so as to rebut that positivist challenge 
and to articulate in a perspicuous and plausible manner a critical theory of 
society. 
The account of a critical theory that Geuss elucidates, critically inspects 
and seeks to defend in an appropriately rationally reconstructed form is not 
that of Marx but basically a Frankfurt School nee-Marxism as adumbrated 
most fully by Jurgen Habermas. He takes it, though he doesn't argue for this, 
to be an account faithful to the general thrust of Marx's work. I think this a 
plausible and interesting strategy and shall not challenge it here. (But we 
should not forget the analytical Marxist challenge.) My interest will be instead, 
whatever its Marxian pedigree, to see how good his case is for a distinctive 
critical theory with a powerful emancipatory capacity. My reason for sticking 
close to Geuss is that it seems to me he has raised the issue -the meta-issue if you 
will- of what is the very idea of a critical theory-the second-order question 
about its nature-more probingly than anyone else. He has understood the force 
of Habermas's theory very well and has a sense of the key questions to ask 
about it. What is at stake is whether we have anything like a viable conception 
of critical theory that marks it as an important and distinctive type of theory. 
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II 
Geuss remarks in his "Introduction" that the Frankfurt account of criticnl 
theory yields three putatively distinguishing features which are the essentinl 
distinguishing features of critical theory: 
1. Critical theories have special standing as guides for human action 
in that: 
(a) they are aimed at producing enlightenment in the agents who 
hold them, i.e. at enabling those agents to determine what their 
true interests are; 
(b) they are inherently emancipatory, i.e. they free agents from 11 
kind of coercion which is at least partly self-imposed, from the 
self-frustration of conscious human action. 
2. Critical theories have cognitive content, i.e. they are forms of 
knowledge. 
3. Critical theories differ epistemologically in essential ways from 
theories in the natural sciences. Theories in natural science are 
'objectifying'; critical theories are 'reflective' .(1-2) 
There are, of course, a host of questions here. Most prominently there are 
questions about what kind of criteria we have for what is emancipatory and 
what is not, whether there are such things as 'true interests' or 'objective 
interests', and what does this talk about 'objectifying theories' and 'reflective 
theories' come to, if anything? Geuss, as we shall see, carefully examines these 
questions. However, before going into that, he contrasts critical theory with 
what critical theorists, using the term in a rather broad sense, call 'positivism'. 
(Popper and Quine on that account, as different as they are from each other and 
as different as they are from logical positivists, are paradigmatic positivists.) A 
positivist is someone who holds (1) that an empiricist account of natural science 
is adequate and (2) "thatallcognitionmusthaveessentiallythesamecognitive 
structure as natural sciences". Positivism also (3) denies the very possibility of 
'reflective knowledge' or 'reflective understanding' because all knowledge has 
the same structure as natural science knowledge and all natural science 
knowledge is objectifying knowledge. We should also note that (2) and (3) are 
also the core of what Habermas calls scientism. Both scientism and positivism 
involve the denial of reflective understanding, or at least any theoretical 
reflective understanding, because they deny that "theories could be both 
reflective and cognitive." (2) The critical question for critical theory is, is there 
really any knowledge or understanding of this sort and, even given some 
fragmentary understanding here, could it ever be a knowledge or an under· 
standing that was embedded in a theory? A central goal of critical theory is the 
critique of positivism and the rehabilitation of 'reflection' as a category of valid 
knowledge. A central question to be asked, in turn, is whether it achieves thnt 
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goal or even makes it sufficiently clear so that we would have some appropriate 
understanding of what achievement comes to here. 
Geuss, before he turns to the details of exaP'lining critical theory, has one 
further general remark to make. He claims that the "very heart of the critical 
theory of society is its criticism of ideology."(2-3) What keeps people from 
correctly perceiving their true situation and real interests is ideology. If they 
are to "free themselves from social repression" they "must rid themselves of 
ideological illusion."(3) Geuss asks "Can 'Ideologiekritik' form the basis of a 
critical theory as defined by the three theses?"(3) So the central effort is to 
"explain what a critical theory is supposed to be" and to ask whether such a 
theory is possible, where I take it that question is to ask whether it is a feasiMe 
possibility. · 
III 
Geuss starts his detailed examination by asking about ideology and the 
critique of ideology. Geuss begins by noting that 'ideology' has been used in 
a number of different ways by various theorists for different purposes. And 
among its uses are a number of neutral descriptive uses. For his distinct 
purposes, purposes rather different than that of a social anthropologist, Geuss 
narrows his conceptualization of ideology "to refer only to the beliefs of the 
agents in thesociety."(7) This also squares withHabermas's usage. But plainly 
not all such beliefs are ideological. Which subset among all the beliefs a people 
have are their ideological beliefs? Geuss goes at that rather indirectly. "It will," 
he remarks, in general ''be an important fact about a given society how the 
various kinds of acts and institutions are individuated .... "(~)) And in this 
individuation, it will be important to ascertain "what kinds of beliefs, beliefs 
of what kind of manifest content, will be able to function as ideologies for what 
domains of action."(9) Again, Geuss notes, since 'ideology' is rather a term of 
art here, the individuation, depending on who is doing it, goes in a number of 
different and possibly confusing ways. His task is to try to define, stipulating 
as he goes along for his purposes of specifying what is the sense of ideology 
used in critical theory's conception of 'ideology critique', a subset of beliefs 
which are ideological. He limits the subset to those beliefs which would 
together constitute the world-view or world-picture of the group in ques-
tion.(9) (Isn't that more likely to be a necessary condition than a sufficient 
condition for an ideology?) Geuss remarks: 
The intuition which motivates the introduction of a concept 
of 'ideology as world-view' is that individuals and groups 
don't just 'have' randomly collected bundles of beliefs, 
attitudes, life-goals, forms of artistic activity, etc. The bundles 
generally have some coherency -although it is very hard to 
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say m genera m w at t s co erency consists- e e emen ts 
in the bundle are complexly related to each other, they all 
somehow 'fit', and the whole bundle has a characteristic 
structure which is often discernible even to an outside 
observer. By an 'ideology' in the ~ense of "world-view'" 
then is meant a subset of the beliefs which constitute the 
ideology of the group (in a purely descriptive sense) which 
has the following properties: 
(a) the elements in the subset are widely shared among the 
agents in the group 
(b) the elements in this subset are systematically intercon-
nected 
(c) they are 'central to the agents' conceptual scheme' in 
Quine's sense, i.e. the agents won't easily give them up 
(d) the elements in the subset have a wide and deep influ-
ence on the agents' behavior or on some particularly 
important or central sphere of action 
(e) the beliefs in the subset are 'central' in that they deal with 
central issues of human life (i.e. they give interpretations 
of such things as death, the need to work, sexuality, etc.) 
or central metaphysical issues. (10) 
This is one way of identifying from the beliefs of a society the subset of beliefs 
to be called ideological. (We need critically to ask if it is a very useful way.) 
There is another way of conceiving of ideology that Geuss discusses. It is 
a way developed by Daniel Bell and other proponents of the end-of-ideology-
thesis. Geuss calls the conception of ideology utilized here "ideology in the 
programmatic sense."(11) An ideology in this sense is a way of translating 
ideas into action."(11) And there is something in addition which for Bell's 
theoretical purposes is very important, namely a conception of' a total ideology' 
where this is construed as an all inclusive system of comprehensive reality: "a 
set of beliefs, infused with passion" which "seeks to transform the whole W'llY 
of life." (11) Put more pedantically a total ideology is: 
(a) a program or plan of action 
(b) based on an explicit, systematic model or theory of how the 
society works . 
(c) aimed at radical transformation or reconstruction of the 
society as a whole 
(d) held with more confidence ('passion') than the evidence for 
the theory or model warrants. (11) 
~ith the ?ddition of (c) and (d) we get a polemical and tendentious us~ of 
1d~lo?f. The acceptance of (d) makes the having of an ideology something 
which is at least mildly irrational and (c) gives the characterization a politic'lll 
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use since now we can say liberals and conservatives, unlike radicals, have no 
ideology since their plans of action are not aimed at a "radical transformation 
or reconstruction of the society as a whole."(11) But we could use just (a) and 
(b) in our co~cep~alization of ~dec:'logy in a p~grammatic sense and perhaps 
getaconceptionofideologywh1ch1snotparti-pris and is a useful social scientific 
tool. 
Next Geuss turns to a very subtle and nuanced analysis of the pejorative or 
critical use of 'ideology' and the social analyses and critiques they can properly 
fit. ~to. Her~ '_Ve get something that is more directly relevant to the ideology-
cntique of cntical theory. I cannot here reproduce the nuanced, complicated 
typology of Geuss's account but I will attempt to give the core of it. (12-22) 
"Whatisatissuehereis the critical use of the term 'ideology'. But that means that 
to show that something is an ideology would be to show that we ought 
somehow to try to eliminate it." (16) The background assumption is, where this 
sense of 'ideology' is being talked about, ttiat the agents who have the ideologi-
cal beliefs "are deluded about themselves, their position, their society and their 
interests" and that being so deluded harms them and keeps them from living 
as flourishing a life as they could have if they did not have those ideological 
beliefs. A critical theory seeks (a) to show why they are so deluded and (b) to 
free them from this delusion. Concerning this Geuss remarks significantly that 
in "the most interesting cases the ideological delusion to be rooted out ... is not 
an empirical error even of a very sophisticated kind but something quite 
different." (12) 
Here we have the famous or (if you will infamous) conception of ideology 
as false consciousness. What is meant here is not, to understate it, crystal clear. 
Geuss, in trying to specify a coherent use for 'false consciousness', asks "In what 
sense or in virtue of what properties can a form of consciousness be ideologi-
cally false?"(l3) Reconsiders three kinds of answers to this question . All of 
them are ways of answering the questions what makes a form of consciousness 
an ideology, what makes a form of consciousness false. 
A. "A form of consciousness is ideologically false in virtue of 
some epistemic properties of the beliefs which are its constitu-
ents."(13) 
B. "A form of consciousness is ideologically false in virtue of its 
functional properties."(13) 
C. "A form of consciousness is ideologically false in virtue of 
some of its genetic properties."(13) 
Consider (A) first. There are a number of ways in which the epistemic 
properties of a belief can render it ideological. The belief may not be supported 
by the available evidence, beliefs of different types may be confused, i.e. we 
may confuse factual beliefs with normative ones. Here a "form of consciousness 
is an ideology if it is essentially dependent on the epistemic status of some of its 
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apparently constituent beliefs."(13) Geuss calls our atte~tio~ to a diverse lot of 
significant ways beliefs can misfire here. (13-14) I will give only one very 
simple case but one which is politically very central. "A form of consciousness 
is ideologically false if it contains a false beli~f to the effect that the particular 
interest of some subgroup is the general interest of the group as aw hole." I shall 
turn to a discussion of this later. We will, that is, then look at this particular 
alleged episte!l'ological misfiring. 
His second general answer, namely (B), to what makes a form of con-
sciousness an ideology is in virtue of some of its functional properties. This 
functionalist approach to ideology has three versions. I shall, however, only 
discuss one. It maintains that" a form of ~onsciousness is an ideology in virtue 
of the function or role it plays in supporting, stabilizing, or legitimizing certain 
kinds of social institutions or practices." (15) This fits well with Habermas's 
speaking of "an ideology as a 'world picture' which stabilizes or legitimizes 
domination or hegemony." But, of course, not all hegemony is bad. The 
hegemony that is objectionable is one that produces more repression than 
necessary for the society. There is for the society more repression than 
necessary where people's needs are not being met as optimally as the level of 
material development of society allows while still not undermining society's 
capacity to maintain and reproduce itself, albeit without its unnecessary 
repressive character. Where this hegemony justifies or supports reprehensible 
social institutions, unjust social practices or relations of exploitation, a form of 
consciousness which just accepts such a state of affairs, without in one way or 
another reacting against it, is an ideological form of consciousness. To accept 
such domination as legitimate is to be held captive by an ideological form of 
consciousness. In speaking of the ideological belief resting on false conscious-
ness, the claim is that if the people with the false conscious came to understand 
how the functional properties of their ideological belief actually worked they 
would give up the belief and thus they would no longer suffer from false 
consciousness or be held captive by an ideology. Their ideological belief rests 
on a rationalization for if the agents in question became aware that these beliefs 
had those functional properties they would abandon them. 
IV 
We have isolated some of the senses of 'ideology' that are vital to critical 
theory. What I have ignored isGeuss's important characterization of a positive 
sense of 'ideology', something that would need attention in a fuller discussion 
of his views and which is an important notion in its own right.(22-26) But it is 
not so central to a discussion of the critique of ideology so I set it aside. 
Traditional critical theory has formulated its conception of the critique of 
ideology in three different ways. 
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1. Radical criticism of society and criticism of its dominant 
ideology (ldeologiekritik) are inseparable; the ultimate goal 
of all social research should be the elaboration of a critical 
theory of society of which ldeologiekritik would be an 
integral part. -
2. ldeologiekritik is not just a form of 'moralizing critic ism', i.e. 
an ideological form of consciousness is not criticised for 
being nasty, immoral, unpleasant, etc. butforbeingfalse, for 
being a form of delusion. ldeologiekritik is itself a cognitive 
enterprise, a form of knowledge. 
3. ldeologiekritik (and hence also the social theory of which it 
· is a part) differs significantly in cognitive structure from 
natural science, and requires for its proper analysis basic 
changes in the epistemological views we have inherited 
from traditional empiricism (modelled as it is on the study 
of natural science). (26) 
Of this conception or cluster of conceptions, Geuss asks two fundamental 
questions: (1) "In what sense is the particular kind of Ideologiekritik under 
discussion cognitive?" and (2) "In what sense would a proper account of the 
kind of ldeologiekritik under discussion require revisions in our inherited 
epistemology?" (26) 
Geuss first considers critique of ideology as a form of "criticism along the 
epistemic dimension"(26) . He asks whether(~ what the Frankfurt.school 
believes) this form of criticism cannot, after all, be accommodated within a 
traditional empiricist framework, accommodated within what the Frankfurt 
school calls positivism. Critical theory characterizes positivism thus: positiv-
ism identifies those statements which, analytic propositions apart, are at least 
potentially true or false. Those are statements which are scientifically testable 
and those in turn are statements with observational content. They also seek to 
identify statements which have cognitive content, by which is meant state-
ments which make genuine knowledge claims. They also seek to identify 
statements which can be rationally assessed, i.e, which are warrantably 
acceptable or regrettable. (It may well be that to make genuine knowledge-
claims they must be warrantably assertible.) Statements without cognitive 
content are cognitively meaningless. There is no sense in which they can be 
rationallyassessedorwarrantablyasserted. Onlythosestatementswhichhave 
observational content -paradigmatically cognitive statements- are s~ie~ti~i­
cally testable. This is what the Frankfurt school characterizes as a sc1enhshc 
view in which rationality is simply and solely scientific rationality and <.~nly 
statements with observational content could possibly be knowledge claims 
which could be subject to rational discussion and criticism? 
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Geuss asks whether such a scientistic positivism (a pleonasm) could 
accommodate ldeologiekritik. Faced with an ideological form of conscious-
ness it could make two forms of criticism. It could in straightforward 
empiricist fashion reject those ideological beliefs which are empirically folseor 
not well supported.(27) It could also in that same vein of argument clearly 
distinguish cognitive from non-cognitive beliefs and reject all second-order 
beliefs which attribute to noncognitive beliefs cognitive standing. (That is a 
familiar positivist critique of religious belief or, if you will, religious ideol-
ogy. )8 The various objectifying beliefs which are a prominent form of ideology 
are subject, from within their empiricist epistemological parameters, to 
positivistically oriented ideology critique. Similarly a positivist oriented cri-
tique of ideology can handle the critique of self-fulfilling beliefs where the 
evidence is tainted. But what it cannot accommodate, Geuss claims, are those 
familiar ideological beliefs which rest on the "confusion of a particular for a 
general interest."(27) Those ideological beliefs, Geuss maintains, are "quite 
beyond the scope of positivist criticism."(27) This claim baffles me. The 
ideological belief in question "contains a false belief to the effect that the 
particular interest of some subgroup is the general interest of the group as a 
whole."(14) Butthatseems tome plainly a factual, empirical beliefwhosetrnth 
or falsity is determined in a standard empirical way. It is in the interest of the 
capitalist class that there be little labor strife (strikes and the like) . Suppose it 
is also asserted that it is in the interest of workers as well that this particular 
interest be satisfied, i.e. thatthere belittle labor strife. What is to be said on such 
matters may not always be obvious, but this is typically true of complex 
empirical matters. But at least in principle what is the case can be determined 
in the same way it is determined whether people should have lots of fiore in 
their diet or have automobile insurance. There is nothing here which is not in 
the purview of positivist critique. 
This seems to be so obvious that I wonder whether Geuss did not have 
something else in mind. What the Frankfurt school believes is that "the 
positivist'snotion of 'rationality' is too narrow and restricted, and can'thandle 
any of the more interesting cases of ideological delusion; by excluding norma-
tive ... beliefs ... from rational discussion and evaluation, the positivist leaves 
without guidance ... important parts of our form of consciousness, and thereby 
abandons whole areas of our life to mere contingent taste, arbitrary decision, 
and sheer ii:rationality."(28) Perhaps what Geuss had in mind about the 
particular interest and general interest was to consider why we should cctcris 
paribus give the latter more weight in moral deliberation. Still, Geuss in a 
related matter asks a very positivistically oriented question of the critical 
theorist. Suppose, a sis not implausible, that instrumental rationality is the only 
clear conception of rationality. How, particularly if that is so, he asks, "do we 
know that taste, preference, and decision aren't the best we can do as guides to 
what attitudes, normative beliefs, etc. we should adopt. How do we know it 
isn't just wishful thinking to think that we have some kind of normative 
knowledge, or attain some rational set of preferences and attitudes."(28) 
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Suppose, to flesh the above considerations out with some examples, I 
prefer jogging to walking because I believe jogging is better for my health . If I 
learn that it is false (empirically false) that jogging is better for my health at my 
age I will then drop that preference if I really p~efer jogging tow alking because 
I believe it is better for my health. However, not all preferences behave that 
way. I might, for an evening's drink, though not at dinner, prefer white wine 
to red wine believing mistakenly that white wine is better for me. However, 
evenafterldiscovermyempiricalmistake,Imightstillcontinuetopreferwhite 
wine to red in those situations simply because in those contexts I enjoy it more. 
For so keeping my preferences in their old mold, even after I recognize my 
cognitive mistake, I need not be any the less rational for all of that. What is 
important to see here, in thinking about how ideology works, is that "if the only 
reason [unlike the white wine case] we hold the belief is that we (falsely) think 
that it is a cognitive belief, then, when we are enlightened about its epistemic 
standing, we will give it up."(29) Suppose A has a tendency to homosexuality 
-it would be his unschooled sexual preference- but is actually heterosexual and 
prefers heterosexuality because he believes homosexuality is unnatural. Ht> 
takes that latter belief to be cognitive beliefbutwhen he discovers it is not-that 
we have no intelligible criteria for what is unnatural and what is not- he will 
give it up and very likely come to prefer homosexuality. When he discovers his 
prior belief about what is unnatural lacks cognitive standing, he will, in all 
likelihood, drop the schooled preference ordering that is dependent on it. 
Indeed, if hedoesn' t, he thereby shows that the preference ordering is really not 
dependentonit. This is not like the case of a person'spreference forwhitewine . 
When a preference or value judgment is presented as a cognitive belief, this, 
where the ideological deception works, tends, where it is believed to be a true 
cognitive belief, to compel acceptance in a way that people will not feel 
compelled. (rationally constrained) to accept other preferences. But when it is 
clearly seen not to be a cognitive belief its hold is dissipated. 
This, or so it seems at least, shows something effective about positivist 
ideology-critique. ''Positivists can count on people giving up beliefs whid1 
have been shown not to be cognitive, but to be expressions of preference which 
cannot be acknowledged publicly as grounds for acting."(27) But, that not-
withstanding, Geuss claims in defense of critical theory that positivists cannot 
give an account of why it is that they make the right judgment here. Geuss 
remarks the "motivation of the program must be to free agents from irrational 
belief and action by causing them to give up beliefs based on preferences those 
agents could not acknowledge: but the positivists can't admit that the motiva-
tion of the program is rational (since there aren't any 'rational motivations') or 
that the effect is to make the agents more rational. So positivists can't justify 
their own activity of criticising ideologies except as a personal preference or 
arbitrary decision." (29-30) 
Geuss in turn gives the positivist a powerful reply. We should ask 
ourselves, reflecting as well on the argument of the previous two paragraphs, 
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whether it does not after all give us all that we need by way of n critical 
conception without going on a complicated detour through the specinl episte-
mological claims of critical theory? I shall quote Geuss's reply on behnlf of the 
positivist in full. · 
To this the positivist may reply that the fact that people 
do change their beliefs as described in the last paragraph is 
no grounds for saying that they have thereby become more 
rational, acquired a more 'justified' or 'truer' or more 'war-
ranted' set of beliefs. What they have done is to bring their 
beliefs, preferences, and value judgments into closer agree-
ment with the rest of their non-cognitive beliefs, e.g. beliefs 
aboutwhich preferences they' ought' to allow themselves to 
express or by which they 'ought' to allow themselves to· be 
moved. From the fact that the resulting set of beliefs, 
preferences, etc. is more coherent and consistent, it doesn' t 
follow that it is 'knowledge', or 'true'. Furthermore, it is 
sheer defamation to claim that positivists need consider 
their own activity a mere 'arbitrary' decision; to say that an 
activity is not grounded on some 'substantial concept of 
human rationality' (whatever that might mean) is not to say 
that it is based on some arbitrary decision. It isn't' arbitrary' 
if it is motivated by deep seated human needs, an expression 
of concern for human suffering, etc. But that doesn't make 
this decision one 'motivated by reason itself' -it is motivated 
by perfectly understandable and. unexceptionable human 
desires. The decision.to eat when one is very hungry is not 
arbitrary- I couldn't equally well have decided to go swim-
ming- but that doesn't make eating a form of knowledge. 
(30) 
While acknowledging the force of the above, still, given their theoretical 
assumptions, there is only a rather constrained sense -or so Geuss nrgues- in 
which positivists can argue about norms. Geuss wonders if it is sufficient to 
provide an adequate ideology-critique. Attitudes, preferences, value judge-
ments and normative beliefs can have no direct observational content and they 
cannot, or so positivists claim, have any cognitive content or be tn1e or folse. 
This being so there is, as Geuss puts it, "strong limits to rational discussion of 
them, and ultimately one can have no warrant for adopting or acting on them; 
·any consistent set of preferences, attitudes, etc. is as good, as 'rational' ns nny 
other." (31) This, Geuss believes, shows that .the positivist conception of 
rationality is impoverished and rests on a mistake. Habermas, Geuss remnrks, 
is perfectly justified in making the obvious counter that "clearly not nny 
consistent set of preferences, attitudes, and normative beliefs is as 'rntionnl' as 
any other. This sense of 'rational' may be unclear and difficult to annlyze but . 
that doesn't mean that it is illicit or doesn't exist, and if positivism cnn' t givenn 
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account of it, so much the worse for positivism."9 Still, recognizing this we 
need not-and indeed should not-go on in a fine rationalist fiddle; we need not, 
and indeed should not, that is, go on to claim " that there is a single, 'true', 
uniquely rational set of preferences, attitudes and normative beliefs."(31) In 
rejecting the positivist attitude because it is too circumscribed, we need not 
claim that there is a distinct something that could be called 'normative 
knowledge', or claim that it even makes sense to say that some preferences are 
true and others false or even that some norms are true and others false. But 
while a factual or mathematical proposition is true or false, it does not mnke 
sense to speak of such propositions as being more or less true or (more 
generally) to speak of truth as admitting of degrees. But, as Geuss observes, 
"rationality is not like that."(31) It admits of degrees. "Decisions, preferences, 
attitudes, etc. can be more or less rational; agents can hnve stronger or weaker 
warrant for their actions, can be more or less aware of their own motives, can 
be more or less enlightened in their normative beliefs." (31) Moreover, suppose 
we have two sets of moral beliefs and attitudes A and Band the persons holding 
A and the persons holding B both seek to have these beliefs form n consistent 
set. More than that, they both seek to get these beliefs nnd attitudes into 
agreement with their other beliefs and with what is understood about the 
world, including what we know about human nature and the social world. 
Doing these things will be seen by reflective agents as a reasonable thing to do. 
A and B both act reasonably in doing this. Now, if A is more successful in 
this than B, then A has a more reasonable account of the world and of how to 
act than B. The greater the coherency here the more rational the account is, i.e. 
the more plausible the whole set of beliefs (normative and non-normntive), 
attitudes, preferences, theories and the like. They are not, in thnt evenh.rnlity, 
just a jumble. Instead, they fit together into a coherent whole: indeed some 
clusters of belief more so than others. What A and B achieve, if they nre 
reasonably successful in their activity (B more so than A), is a coherent cluster 
of beliefs, attitudes, etc. It is always a matter of more or less here. Some 
accounts have fewer loose ends than others: are more coherent thnn others llnd 
those accounts are the accounts that it is the more reasonable to hold. But we 
hardly have any conception of 'perfect coherency' here; that, like 'perfect 
clarity', is something we have little understanding of (Wittgenstein wns very 
much on the mark here.) Yet some accounts have more warrant than others, fit 
things together more adequately than others. We are not in a place where we 
should speak of arbitrariness or should say that decision is king. 
v 
Geuss turns now to an examination of functionalist accounts of ideology, 
that is, to the functional properties of forms of consciousness. Here an 
"ideology is a world-picture which stabilizes or legitimizes dominntion."(31) 
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Geuss asks of such an account "what is the relation between the 'falsity' of the 
form of consciousness and its functioning to support or legitimize oppres-
sion?"(32) He then, in an acute but inconclusive discussion, examines four 
possibilities.(32-26) I shall only discuss on~. It is, however, one of crucial 
importance. It is this: "the world-picture is false -we assume from the start that 
we have whatever grounds are necessary for asserting that- and the judgment 
that the world-picture functions oppressively is parasitic on our judgment that 
it is false."(32) A crucial case is this. We have a world-picture that is false, 
whereby what is meant is that no rationally warranted world-picture could 
yield a sound argument for the de jure legitimacy of the set of institutions and 
practices of that society. Some of the normative beliefs, some key factual beliefs 
and, as well, the merely factual sounding beliefs embedded in these institutions 
and practices are unwarranted and there are no rational reconstructions of 
them (or at least none are plausibly in sight) which would render them 
warrantable Oustifiable, rationally acceptable to people with clear heads and 
accurate factual information). No world-picture, acceptable and accessible to 
agents, where they are accurately informed and reasoning correctly (makin~ 
no invalid inferences), could yield sound arguments for the de jurc legitimacy 
of their social institutions. Yet, though the institutions continue to function 
oppressively (they cause unnecessary suffering, deprivation of needs and 
impede human flourishing), the agents continue to accept them and believe in 
their legitimacy. People who stand free of the ideology in question, know or 
reasonably believe the institutions to be oppressive (repress beyond what 
could be rationally justified). They know or reasonably believe, that is, that 
there are no justified or justifiable norms or warrantably assertible norms 
which would justify those repressive institutions. Here the judgment that the 
world-picture functions oppressively is parasitic on the judgment that the 
world-picture is false. In saymg it is false, what is meant is that it is constituted 
by a set of factual beliefs and factual sounding beliefs where some of the crucial 
ones are false or incoherent and where that world-picture as well has a set of 
normative beliefs which cannot be warrantably asserted. There is in that 
society the deprivation of human wants and needs, and there is human 
suffering and lack of self-fulfillment. Moreover, these maladies cannot be 
shown to be unfortunate necessities to be born with, for the norms used to 
justify the institutions requiring these ills could not have a rational warrant, 
given the development of the productive forces and their potential for further 
development in our time and some quite unproblematic facts about human 
nature (e.g. that people have certain identifiable needs and in most circum-
stances do not want them frustrated). The functional picture is that we have an 
ideology which is a world-picture which stabilizes or legitimizes domination. 
That is its principal function on such a conception. In the situation described 
here -a typical situation- our judgment that it so functions depends on our 
judgment that the world-picture is false in the way specified above. The 
soundness of such an argument, as Geuss stresses in another context, depends 
crucially on our being able to give an objective (rationally warranted 
intersubjective) account of what our wants, desires and needs are and, in 
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relation to them, what the requirements of the economy are.(35) He goes on to 
remark,correctlyibelieve, thattheseconceptualizationsarenotunproblematic. 
Geuss remarks that "associated with every, human society there will be a 
set of 'accepted' wants, 'needs' and desires and a traditional level of expected 
satisfactions of these wants and desires."(35) But here ideological consider-
ations return like the repressed, for, Geuss goes on to remark, "the set of 
'accepted' wants, needs and desires, and the traditional level of consumption 
may themselves be part of the 'ideology' we wish to criticize."(36) What we 
seem at least to need, but it appears at least that we do not have, and perhaps 
cannot have, is "a standpoint outside the given social interpretation of the 
agents' needs, from which to criticize the ideological picture of needs and wan ts 
and their proper scheduling. Any appeal that would claim our only real needs 
are those which must be satisfied to ensure minimal biological survival would, 
though it might break out of the ideological circle, not be adequate for a critical 
normative perspective. Even very oppressive social orders do not threaten 
biological survival generally. Some individuals might go under -predictably 
would go under- but most would not and the species would survive. To 
intellectually combat such a society we need (a) a justified conception of social 
justice, (b) a rationally warranted picture of what our genuine wan ts and needs 
are along with an account of which are the more basic, ( c) a scheduling of their 
relative importance when they conflict, and finally ( d) an accurate picture of the 
level of material development in the world: a good understanding of the 
capacity of the productive forces to continue to develop and some reasonable 
understanding of the mechanisms for their development. Is it plausible to 
believe that we can get an adequate account of these things? It indeed asks for 
a lot but what it asks for does not seem at least to be a conceptual impossibility . 
VI 
An ideology is (at least) a form of consciousness which answers to certain 
class interests, most typically the interests of the dominant class in the society, 
where the ideology has intellectual and moral hegemony. Where we speak of 
an ideology as a world-picture we can speak of the world picture as answering 
to such class interests. A simple way, following this consideration out, of 
stating what Ideologiekritik would characteristically come to is to say that those 
who "suffer from ideologically false consciousness are deluded about their own 
true interests."( 45) A central-perhaps the principal- task of Idcolngickri tik is to 
enlighten people so deluded, or prone to such delusion or at risk of coming to 
be so deluded, about their true interests.( 45) The thing is to help people to come 
to see what their true interests are. Understanding class interests and under-
standing how deeply antagonistic they are is of ~ital importance here. 
As attractive as it is, this, as is widely recognized, gives rise to a whole 
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hornet's nest of problems: what is a human interest? How, if at all, does it differ 
from what people want or desire? And what are their true, genuine, objective 
or real interests? Is it just that a bunch of persuasive definitions are being 
surreptitiously introduced or do these adjec~ves actually qualify interests and 
if so how? These are just some of the problems, though they are the key ones, 
that well up concerning interests. Geuss identifies the key problems thus: what 
mightit "mean to distinguish the 'true' or 'real' or 'objective' interests of agents 
from their 'merely apparent' or 'merely phenomenal' or 'perceived' interests, 
and what might be meant by the claim that a group of agents is deceived or 
deluded about its true interests?"(45) 
Geuss, though I think he may overdo this point, wants to treat both 
'desires' and 'needs' as theoretical constructs. I think pace Geuss that we 
discover them and then, to overcome certain ambiguities in our concephlaliza tion 
of them, we make some stipulations on our use of the terms. But perhaps there 
is little more than a verbal difference between us here and in any event it is not 
central. It is crucial, however, to distinguish between desires, interests and 
needs. Geuss writes: 
Up to now I have spoken of wants, interests, needs, 
desires, and preferences of a group of agents as if they were 
all more or less the same thing. We attribute a set of wants, 
preferences, and desires to a group of agents on the basis of 
their explicit avowals-that is, on the basis of what they sny 
theywant-andon thebasisoftheirachlalovertbehavior. But 
the avowals may be confused, fragmentary, and contradic-
tory, and may stand in a most tenuous relation to a body of 
equally confused and conflict-ridden behavior. We neither 
wish to take what they say strictly at face-value despite 
overwhelming evidence that they never act on their avowed 
'desires,' nor will we want to ignore completely the fact of 
human weakness and assume that their sincere assertions 
are hypocritical, if they don't always act on them. So the set 
of desires and preferences we attribute to the group is a 
theoretical construct which fills out the fragmentary evi-
dence, removes some of the contradictions between avow a ls 
and behavior, wants and desires of which no individual 
member is aware. It will be quite difficult in making this 
theoretical construct not to impose on the group too determ i-
na te and coherent a set of desires; when should apparent 
contradictions be allowed to stand and what kind of rational-
ity assumptions should be made when smoothing them out? 
Individuals and groups, then, may be unaware of some of 
their own desires and preferences, i.e. on the basis of their 
manifest behavior we may have reason to attribute to them 
preferences and desires which they not only themselves 
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never articulate, but which they would verbally disavow. 
(45-46) 
Needs, by contrast, aredefinedandidentifi~d by reference to the successful 
functioning of individuals, and (according to Geuss) to societies as well. People 
can determine whether or not they need food, rest, sex, security, work, friend-
ship, companionship, recognition, community, social identity or religion by 
determining whether these things are necessary for their successful function-
ing. Sometimes it is fairly obvious as in the cases of rest and food, companion-
ship and recognition; at other times it is less obvious. It is also the case that 
'successful functioning' is a rather flexible and indeterminate conception and 
that in some cases we cannot determine (at least at the present) with any 
assurance what it would come to. It is even more difficult with respect to 
society. What is it, Geuss asks rhetorically, for a society to be 'healthy' or 
'pathological'? Surely these are not unproblematic notions. But it does not at all 
follow from that that nothing can be made of them. However, even where we 
are speaking of individuals, in some cases we cannot, or cannot clearly, deter-
mine what is necessary for successful functioning, in other cases we can 
determine it quite unproblematically. If, for example, I want to ftmction at <111 
successfully I better not try to get along on two hours of sleep per night for l1 
fortnight. Because sometimes we do not know what to say we should not hl1ve 
a fit of skepticism. Sometimes what we need to successfully function is quite 
unproblematic. 
In most cases we are aware of our own desires but in a not inconsidert1ble 
numberofcaseswewillnotbeawareofourownneeds. Whatweclet1rheadedly 
avow we want seems to settle it for when we avow it at least, but what we 
clearheadedly avow that we need does not settle it. We may honestly a vow that 
weneedsomethingwhenwedonotand similarlydenythatweneedsomething 
when we really do. But, very unusual circumstances aside, ifl honestly st1 y I t1 m 
tiredand want to go to bed thatsettlesitina way my claim that I need more sleep 
than I have been getting lately does not. Someone might correctly assert thl1t I 
sleep too much anyway and do not need any more sleep and their assertion 
might very well be true, my avowals to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The concept of interest is tricky. Geuss, rightly I believe, carefully distin-
guishes between desires and interests. People may not take an interest in 
satisfying their own desires and wishes. And they may (though Geuss doesn't 
note that) take no interest in what is in their own interest. Crucially, they may 
desire things that are not in their own interests or not at all desire or wt1nt what 
it is in their own interests to have. Evidence that the difference here is not just 
that between first-order and second-order desires is brought out by the follow-
ing example. "Unregenerate alcoholics assert that they haven strong desire for 
drink and deny that they have any desire not to drink, and their beht1vior bears 
them out. Still, the unregenerate alcoholic has an interest in not drinking (t1nd 
in developing the appropriate second-order desire)."(47) He has this interest 
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though he may take no interest in what is in his interest. This shows that, given 
our common employment of concepts, desires and interests (and needs as well) 
are importantly different. (This is reflected in French, Engli~h a.nd German in 
our use of the relevant terms. But presumably these generalizations about use 
to show what our concepts are would go over to other natural languages as well. 
H they do not, we are surely in trouble.) 
For the sake of discussion at least, one could accept, though not at all for 
Churchlandian reasons, that interests is a suspect concept, a concept that we 
should perhaps set aside as we do the concept of sin. For, as Geuss asks, going 
back totheabovecaseof theunregeneratealcoholic: " ... whatdoes itmean to say 
thatalcoholicshaveaninterest, butnodesiretorestricttheirdrinkingotherthan 
we, the outside observers, think that it would be better for them not to have the 
desire for drink?" (Emphasis mine, 47) I think it does mean more than th<lt. To 
see this we should start by recognizing that the concept of interest is problem-
atic and obscure, Geuss claims, "partly because it is suppose to connect or 
'mediate reason' with the faculty of 'desire' ."(47) Interests arise out of desires. 
If we were not creatures who had desires we would not be creatures that had 
interests. Yourcarmayhaveneedsbutithasnointerests. Onlybeingswhohad 
desires could have interests. But from this it does not follow that interests and 
desires are the same thing. 
Geuss, fastening in now on a specification of what he takes this elusive 
concepfof interest to be, remarks: "To speak of an agent's 'interests' is to speak 
of the way that agent's particular desires could be rationally integrated into a 
coherent 'good life'."(47-8) We can specify clearly enough what that would 
come to in some specific ·cases as Geuss does: "Alcoholics can be said to have an 
'interest' in giving up drink, even if they don't recognize it because we know 
that health (and, in extreme cases, life itself) is central to their conception of the 
'good life' and that excessive drinking cannot be integrated into such a life."(48) 
That is a useful and successful example, and we no doubt could extensively 
provide other and similar examples. Still, I think it is not a very satisfactory way 
of procee<;ling. It is not that we come to understand what is good from 
understanding what our interests are, but we come to understand what our 
inte!ests are from knowing what is good, or at least from understanding what 
webelievetobegood. Oneoftheseemingadvantagesoftalkingaboutinterests 
-think of its role in a theory like that of Ralph Barton Perry's or Paul Ziff' s- is that 
we would have, if those theories are on the mark, in talking about interests, a 
purely naturalistic and empirical concept that we could appeal to without 
appealing to any prior moral or normative notions and which, in tum, we could 
use in giving content to our conceptions of the good. But if we have to specify 
what our interests are by way of a conception of a coherent good life we have 
lost that naturalistic advantage and, moreover, and independently, we have 
taken to specifying something which is not very clear in terms of something 
which is still less clear, namely a conception of 'a coherent good life' where 
'good life', to add insult to injury, is put in scare quotes by Geuss. 
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VII 
Be that as it may, we have a sufficient specification of desires, needs and 
interests here to be able correctly to say that ~ple can rightly be said to be 
mistaken about what they desire, need and what is in their interests. And this 
leaves conceptual space for the very possibility of ldeologiekritik. 
Geuss puts the point well: 
Just as I may have wants and desires of which I am 
unaware-wants and desires I evince in my behavior, but 
which I do not recognize and avow-and needs of which I am 
unaware, I can also have interests of which I am unaware. 
From thefactthatlhavea certain need, it does not follow that 
I have a desire to satisfy that need. HI am unaware of the 
need I may not act in any way which could be construed as 
trying to satisfy the need. However I do wish to say that I 
have an 'interest' in the satisfaction of anything which can 
reasonably be termed a 'need'. 
There is no mystery, then, to the claim that agents are 
deceived or mistaken about their wants and desires or their 
interests. I may sincerely avow a desire which my behavior 
belies, or vehemently repudiate a desire, which, as my be-
havior shows, I clearly have. If the agents are unaware of 
some of their needs, they may have formed a set of interests 
which is incompatible with the satisfaction of those needs, or 
they may have formed a set of interests which is inconsistent 
or self-defeating, or I may have perfectly good 'empirical' 
grounds for thinking that the pursuit of their present set of 
interests will lead them not, as they suppose, to happiness, 
tranquillity, and contentment, but to pain, misery, and frus-
tration. H agents are deceived or mistaken about their 
interests, we will say that they are pursing 'merely apparent' 
interests, and not their 'real' or 'true' interests. (48) 
This via-negativa may be enough. Still theoreticians who have engaged in 
ldeologiekritik have, not unreasonably, wanted so·mething more robust. They 
have wanted to speak in some reasonably determinate way of 'real', 'true' or 
'objective' interests sans scare quotes. They have wanted to say what they are 
and how we could come to know them. Geuss takes the problem here to be that 
of defining 'true interests' and he considers two attempts to do so, tlzc 'pcrfcct-
knowledge approach' and the 'optimal conditions approach'. 
The perfect-knowledge approach can most easily be illustrated if we tum 
again to the unregenerate alcoholic example. Suppose Matti is such an alco-
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holic. He has a strong first-order desire to drink, no second-order desire to stop 
or even moderate his drinking and he does not see that it is in his interests to stop 
drinking. But, as Geuss points out, we can still correctly say he does not know 
his true interests. He takes no interest in and does not see that it is in his own 
interest to stop drinking because he is ignorant and has false views about what 
is in his own interests. He has never heard of cirrhosis and he thinks that 
drinking is good for his circulation. "In that case we say that he is mistnken 
about his interests, and what we mean by that is that if he knew more thnn he 
does -if, for instance, he had correct views about the effects of drinking on his 
health- he would recognize that it is not in his interest to drink." ( 49) As we gain 
the appropriate knowledge we will gain an even clearer and more correct view 
about what our interests actually are. Extrapolating from that we should say 
that if we were tohaveperfect knowledge then w e would finally know whntour 
true interests are. 
There are at least two problems with this approach but they m ay very well 
not be insuperable. One is what is to count as perfect knowledge? "Presumnbly it 
must include at least all empirical knowledge of the kind that can be provided 
by the sciences, but does it include such things as the kind of self-knowledge 
acquired in psychoanalysis or know ledge of w ha t could satisfy n person. 
(Asked in quite a first person w ay.) Do I kn ow my real in terests if I h<lve 
available 'perfect' empirical knowledge, but have not u sed it to reflect correctly 
on my present wants and interests to m ake them consisten t?"(49) (And what 
does 'reflect correctly' come to here? H ow do we test w hen we have done it 
right? Recall the importance that tha t arch positivist Rudolph Carnap attached 
to testability.) How strong we should m ake the requirem ent for 'perfect 
knowledge' here is not evident. Moreover, it is not independent nf whnt we 
think we can know. If our approach is rather positivist and we are wary about 
talk of 'self-knowledge', we will work with a more minimal conception of 
perfect knowledge. If, altema tively, we think tha t such caution here reflects our 
being hobbled by a scientistic metaphysics (metaphysics within the limits of 
natural science alone), we will go for a richer conception of p erfect knowledge, 
a conception that involves some appeal to self-knowledge. Whichever way we 
go, we seem to do so because we embrace one of two stances about whnt it is 
possible to know: the positivist one or the critical theory one. 
If we take the latter route we need to be prepared to give an accounting of 
what reflective knowledge comes to. (I do not, however, want to suggest for a 
moment that we cannot. But only to say that we need very carefully to do it.) 
I thin.kit also needs to be noted that even if w e takethe positivistminimalistway 
here to perfect knowledge (and thus rather limit ourselves) w e still cnn get a 
good empirical look into what our true interests are. 
There is a second difficulty that may be no more than a putative d ifficulty. 
If Matti, let us say, gains p erfect knowledge about his excessive drinking: 
knowledge, that is, about alcohol's effect on his liver, his brain, his ability to 
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control his life, keep his job and the like-that is, if he is clear about how much 
it will harm him, and he reflectively and in a cool hour takes all this to heart, and 
still doesn't judge that it is n ot in his interests to drink then his continuing to 
drink does not, on the perfect-knowledge app roach, after all, run athwart his 
genuine interests. What is in Matti's interests (by d efinition on this account) is 
what Matti takes to be in his interestw}:len he has perfect knowledge reflectively 
entertained in a cool hour. But, if the result of such an entertainment by Mntti 
is that of the above, it is not impossible to think that this is a rcductio of such a 
definition of 'true interests'. Such a definition of ' interests' is just too subjective. 
We moved from talk of desires to talk of interests, in the first place, to avoid such 
1 subjectivism. Now we are back _in the stew again. 
To this response in return it might be replied: people as a matter of fact just 
do not so judge of their interests. It is only by dragging in irrelevant desert-
island examples -things w hich are little more than mere logical possibilities-
that it can come to seem that what would be in Matti's true interests in such a 
circumstance is at all problematic. It just is not in a person's interests, if their 
circumstances are at all normal, to drink themselves to death. If the person in 
question w ould judge otherwise even under conditions of perfect knowledge 
that does not change matters. But that, if correct, certainly reveals a weakness 
in the perfect-knowledge approach. We cannot determine in all cases what are in 
our true interests by ascertaining what we would desire or what we would 
choose under conditions of perfect knowledge. 
Geuss next considers the 'optimal conditions approach' to ascertain what our 
true interests are. It starts, Geuss points out, "from the observation that the 
desires and hence the intere.sts of human agents have been extremely variable, 
and that what desires and interests the agents will form will depend to a large 
extent on the circumstances in wh ich they find themselves."(49) In horrifying 
circumstances-circumstances of great deprivation and suffering-people, as the 
lk, will behave in h orrendous ways. Where these behavior patterns get 
stamped in, people will tend to act in these ways for a time even if it no longer 
answers to their interests to d o so. To lookforpeople'sreal interests, the optimal 
conditions approach argues, we need to ascertain what interests would be 
formed under optim al (i.e. beneficent) conditions.(50) It is, as Geuss notes, 
difficult to say what these optimal conditions for forming interests are. And he 
does notsay, orevenhint a t, wh attheyare, thoughhedoessaywhattheyaren't, 
namely "positive h indrances to the formation of 'true' interests. "(SO) Wh<lt 
impedes the formation of true interests are extreme deprivation, circumstances 
where p eople are m altreated or unduly coerced, pressured or influenced, or in 
conditions of considerable ignorance or where they have many false beliefs. 
Where those conditions or conditions like them do not obtain, we approach 
optimal conditions. Interests formed under those optimal conditions are our 
true interests. Interests formed under conditions approximating those optimal 
conditions are apprbximations of ou r true interests. 
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The question arises as to whether the true interests identified under the 
perfect-knowledge approach and the optimal-conditions approach are the same. 
Prima fade at least they are distinct for "the task of becoming fully aware of the 
wants and interests one actually has is different from the task of acquiring the 
'right' human interests -the ones one would have been able to acquire had one 
lived in supremely fortunate circumstances." (50) Geuss argues that appear-
ances here are deceiving and both approaches yield the same true interests and 
do not conflict with each other, for in coming to have perfect knowledge we will 
come to know what the optimal conditions for forming desires and interests a re. 
And in that way, given that we would want what we recognize to be most 
beneficial (optimal) for ourselves, we would seek to put ourselves in that 
1
, 
. optimal position. Optimal conditions are conditions of, at the very least, non-
deprivation, non-coercion and minimally correct information . People who 
grow up, as we do, in conditions which are far from optimal, but still not so bad 
as the conditions of some others, will in that situation have interests which are 
somewhatdifferentfromthetrueintereststhey(we)wouldhaveunderoptimal 
conditions. Thatnotwithstanding, we (that is people so formed), where we see 
they were so optimal, would still prefer to live under optimal conditions where 
different interests would form: interests which are our true interests and which 
we would recognize to be such in optimal circumstances. 
Interests, we should also note, are not only related to effective desire but a lsu 
to judgment. As we saw in the alcoholic case, it is possible for an alcoholic to haw 
no effective desire, second order or otherwise, to stop drinking and still judge 
thatitisnotinhistrueinterests to drink so much and mean by that that if he had 
been born and had grown up in more optimal circumstances the interests he 
would have formed would include an interest in not drinking to excess. And, 
if he had grown up in those circumstances, he would at the very least have 
formed a second-order desire not to drink so excessively and he would, as well, 
judge that it is not in his true interests to so drink. Moreover, th is is also a 
judgment he would realize, if he were in such circumstances, he would have 
made if he had perfect knowledge and that he would have perfect knowledge 
in such circumstances. '1f the agents have the requisite 'perfect know ledge' the 
interests they will acknowledge as their 'real interests' will be those they know 
they would form under optimal conditions of non-deprivation and non-
coercion."(53) (But we still have the counter-example trotted out above.) 
Geuss thinks that this claim is at least roughly correct and that it is a claim 
that Habermas and the Frankfurt school would accept, though for slightly 
differentreasons. Buttheywouldalsostressthedoublebind thatweare inhere. 
They would stress, as more orthodox Marxists do as well, that a society, all of 
whose members live under conditions of great deprivation, is not going to gain 
even anything like (even remotely approximating) perfect know ledge. We can 
approach that only as the development of the productive forces advances very 
far and there is a considerable amount of social wealth· widely distributed. 
Moreover, the knowledge we need to gainofourwants,needs, motives, of what 
disCk>sure: The Buying and Selling of Culture 
Meta-Comments on the Very Idea of a Crirical Them)' 131 
kind of life one would find acceptable and satisfying and the like is only 
something we will attain, if we attain it at all, in a society where there is 
"extensive room for free discussion and the unrestrained play of the imagina-
tion with alternative ways of living." (54) Ou: real or true interests are the 
interests we would form or come to have in conditions of perfect knowledge 
and freedom . Still there are problems here and Geuss shows us our bind here 
and something of the way out of it . 
This line of argument shows how 'real interests' in both senses might 
converge, but only at the cost of creating a double bind: the interests the agents 
would form given perfect knowledge coincide with those they would form in 
optimal conditions, because the agents couldn't acquire 'perfect knowledge' 
unless they were in 'optimal conditions'. But to be in 'optimal conditions' is not 
only to bein conditions of freedom, but also not to lack any relevant knowledge. 
We can't be fully free without having perfect knowledge, nor acquire perfect 
knowledge unless we live in conditions of complete freedom . Our ' renl 
interests' are those we would form in such conditions of perfect knowledge nnd 
freedom. Although we can be in a position fully to recognize our ' real interests' 
only if our society satisfies the utopian condition of perfect freedom, still, 
although we do not live in that utopia, we may be free enough to recognize how 
we might act to abolish some of the coercion from which we suffer and move 
closer to 'optimal conditions' of freedom and knowledge. The task of a critical 
theory is to show us which way to move. (54) 
Endnotes 
1. Raymond Geuss, The Idea of Critical Theory (Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). Future references to Geuss's book will be given in the 
text. 
2. JurgenHabermas,Autonomyand Solidarity (London: New Left Books, 1987). 
3. Friedrich Engels, "Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx" in Robert C. Tucker 
(ed), The Marx-Engels Reader 2nd Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 
681-82. 
4. See the various essays and particularly John Roemer's introduction tl~ the 
volume he edited, Analytical Marxism (Cambridge, England: Cambndge 
University Press, 1984). See the various essays, but particularly !he essay.by 
Andrew Levine in Kai Nielsen and Robert Ware (eds.), A11aly=111g Marxism 
(Calgary: Univ~rsity of Calgary Press, 1989) and G.A. Cohen's scattered 
methodological remarks in his History. l.Abour. and Freedom (Oxford, En-
disClosure: The Buying and Selling of Culmre 
132 Kai Nielsen 
gland: Clarendon Press, 1988), xi, 239-40, 290-91. 
5. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies~ Vol II (London: Routledge nnd 
Kegan Paul, 1945), 81-58. 
6. G.A. Cohen, History. Uibour, and Freedom; Jon Elster, Making Sense ~f Marx 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985); John E. Roemer, 
Free to Lose (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); nnd Jeffrey 
Reiman, "Exploitation, Force and the Moral Assessment of Capitalism: 
Thoughts on Roemer and Cohen," Philosophy and Public Affa irs 16, no. 1 
.(Winter 1987): 3-41. 
7. Carl Hempel, "Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives" in 
Theodore E. Geraets (ed.), Rationality Today (Ottawa: University of Ott11wn 
Press, 1979), 46-66. 
8. I explicitly carry this out for religious claims in my "On Speaking of God," 
Theoria 28 (1962):110-137. Reprinted in Mostafa Faghfo ury (ed .), Analytical 
Philosophy of Religion in Canada (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1982), 
75-96. 
9. Kai Nielsen, "True Needs, Rationality and Emancipation" in R. Fitzgernld 
(ed.), Human Needs and Politics (Melbourne, Australia: Pergamous Press, 
1977); Kai Nielsen, "Principles of Rationality," Philosophical Papers ill, no. 2 
(October 1974); Kai Nielsen, "Can There be an Emancipatory Rntion11lity?" 
Criticaill,no. 24(December1976), 70-102;Kai Nielsen, "Distrusting Retlson," 
Ethics 87, no. 1 (October 1976); and Kai Nielsen, "Reason and Sentiment" in 
Theodore Geraets (ed.), Rationality Today (Ottawa: University of Ott11wn 
Press, 1979), 249-79. 
disCwsure: The Buying and Selling of Culture 




University of Chicago Press 
Reviewed by Erik Reece 
Seemingly since Jacob Epstein's 1988 polemic, "Who Killed Poetry?" 
there has been much sectarian ballyhoo over the purpose of poetry in the 
contemporary, highly m~diated American techno-culture. The post-Bent 
practitioners, trafficking in subversive subject matter, rail against the 
formulaic lyric that creative writing workshops manufacture in what has 
to be the worst example of supply-side economics since 11of1ody, so the 
argument goes, reads poetry anyway. Those cloistered inside university 
creative writing workshops blame the recondite experiments of the West 
Coast scholl loosely labelled "the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets", for mak-
ing verse incomp rehensible to that shadowy figure, the man in the street. 
The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E apologists riposte that since the world is no 
longer Wordsworth's pastoral sanctuary of self, the mawkish solipsism of 
formal lyric poety is little more than reactionary drivel. 
There are so many schools of poetry and so many genealogies leading 
to its modern matrix, that to pronounce poetry dead is to profess one's own 
ignorance of this p rotean field - perhaps the only modem art form whose 
emergence hasn 't been hamstrung by commercial distractions, as is par-
ticularly the case with film and painting. The question, then, "Who killed 
poetry?" must be translated into "Who killed poetry's audience?" The 
assumption behind both questions is that if American readers have turned 
their backs on poetry, the poets themselves must have mnde a mistake 
somewhere. Complacent critics who gauge such shifts employ popularity, 
which then becomes equated w ith populism (in fact a vastly different 
political enterprise), as a barometer for an art form's vitality. And while it 
iseasytowaxnostalgicabouta lost oral tradition and the days when poetry 
appeared on the front pages of daily newspapers, American audiences 
have never been moved by poetry in the way we are told Vladimir 
Mayakovsky electrified stadiums-full of the Russian masses. While Carl 
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